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NYC is considering weapons detection solutions for their subway system, what are some of the main logistical considerations you would weigh regarding such a deployment?

There are several very significant considerations, let alone dozens of smaller tactical considerations:

The NYC subways are the exact opposite and the epitome of 'UnDirected' environments. There is no trade-offs such as high volume of traffic for low personal items. This is an environment of High Volume of patron traffic, with unpredictable traffic flows, with a high volume of large personal items. Marry this with a new characteristics - agitation. Few people are irritated if stopped on entry to a school to check for weapons. 100% of patrons in the subway will be.

The NYC subways are the exact opposite and the epitome of 'UnDirected' environments. There is no trade-offs such as high volume of traffic for low personal items. This is an environment of High Volume of patron traffic, with unpredictable traffic flows, with a high volume of large personal items, and more. Marry this with a new characteristic - agitation. Few people are irritated if stopped on entry to a school to check for weapons. 100% of patrons in the subway will be.

The "Flow" of the subway system is a large, complex, and highly organic system that has been developed over time, shaped by the stations, the people, and so many other things. Well established systems with millions of stakeholders who integrate to, and support the current system, do not react well when change is forced upon them. New Weapons systems have to adapt and change in order to integrate into the existing system flow. It will fail it the Subsystem is forced to adapt to the new system.

As an example, a telephone network is a complex process that has developed over 100 years. The users are very familiar with how it works. Imagine a scenario where a new cybersecurity app was added to prevent phishing attacks, but it injected a 2 second pause of dead air when a user makes a phone call, and they don’t hear the familiar ringing tone immediately. Everyone would hang up, try again, and the subsequent repeated dialing by billions of users would crash the system.

Placement of systems and footprint is critical. They will have to be placed at natural "chokepoints" in order to maximize the ability to screen, while minimizing the solution costs. The challenge is many of these chokepoints are already "choked" - therefore the name!. So processes to keep people moving through are critical. Some aggressive math needs to be done to ensure the staffing, and systems are scaled to meet peak hour traffic, and the processes designed to minimize the expected lines this approach would take with currently available technology.

Placement of systems and footprint is critical. They will have to be placed at natural "chokepoints" in order to maximize the ability to screen, while minimizing the solution costs. The challenge is many of these chokepoints are already "choked" - therefore the name! So, processes to keep people moving through are critical. Some aggressive math by a contingent of data scientists needs to be done to ensure the staffing, and systems and processes are scaled to meet peak hour traffic, and the processes designed to minimize the expected lines this approach would take with currently available technology. This is a complex problem in the order of magnitude of the heavy and continuously daily data crunching done by the airline industry.

Do you recommend weapons detection to be used in the NYC subway? Why or why not?

Yes, but at the right time, and after the pragmatic analysis of all aspects of implementation. The application can be a logistical nightmare, a staffing challenge, and a significant patron experience detriment. These issues will reduce over time, with further maturing of the available solutions int he market. There are other complex questions that have to be addressed, such as concerns over personal rights infringement, right-to-carry laws, and more. Like any technology, weapons detection solutions are in the early stages of their innovation cycles. They work well in directed traffic environments, but poorly in undirected environments. You cannot force a very large, highly undirected system like the NYC Subway system to suddenly act in a Directed manner. It's too late for that. So weapons detection systems need further maturing, perhaps specifically to fit into these types of situations. Said another way, Weapons detection systems need to change and adapt to the UnDirected environments "flow" versus force-fitting the Subway System to adapt to the Weapons detection systems.

Yes, but at the right time, and after the pragmatic analysis of all aspects of implementation. The application can be a logistical nightmare, a staffing challenge, and a significant patron experience detriment. These issues will reduce over time, with further maturing of the available solutions in the market. There are other complex questions that have to be addressed, such as concerns over personal rights infringement, right-to-carry laws, and more. Like any technology, weapons detection solutions are in the early stages of their innovation cycles. They work well in directed traffic environments, but poorly in undirected environments. You cannot force a very large, highly undirected system like the NYC Subway system to suddenly act in a Directed manner. It's too late for that. So, weapons detection systems need further maturing, perhaps specifically to fit into these types of situations. Said another way, weapons detection systems need to change and adapt to the UnDirected environments "flow" versus force-fitting the Subway System to adapt to the Weapons detection systems.

Given people carry many different items on the subway, would that impact a weapons detection performance and false positives?

Lets look at Penn station, which has approximately 600,000 patrons every day. Assuming 15% or 75,000 go through at rush-hour. At a typical 5% false positive rate that is 1 person that has to be stopped, pulled aside and screened every second. This will be magnified when we consider the standard subway rider and we would likely see a more likely 30-50% false alert rate. That is 6 to 10 secondary screens every every second.....

Let’s look at Penn station, which has approximately 600,000 patrons every day. Assuming 15% or 75,000 go through at rush-hour. At a typical 5% false positive rate that is 1 person that has to be stopped, pulled aside and screened every second. This will be magnified when we consider the standard subway rider, and that we would likely see a more likely 30-50% false alert rate. That is 6 to 10 secondary screens every second.....

Generally, what are the conditions you recommend for deploying a weapons detection solution (i.e. type of facility/venue, personnel, indoor, outdoor, number of systems etc.)?

Generally, what are the conditions you recommend for deploying a weapons detection solution (i.e. personnel, indoor, outdoor, number of systems etc.)?

- Staffing is required, otherwise what is the point? A system alerts indicated a detected weapon, and then someone has to address the alert.

Staffing is required, otherwise what is the point? A system alert indicates a detected weapon, and then someone has to address the alert.

- Training is critical. These staff must be well trained on all nuances of the processes and procedures, which in turn must be well defined in the first place. In the same way the TSA is trained to address complex and nuanced situations, or the NYC police themselves, the security staff that is now engaging with the public in public locations has to be well trained, law enforcement individuals.

Training and retraining is critical. The staff must be well trained on all nuances of the processes and procedures, which in turn must be well defined in the first place. In the same way the TSA or the NYC police themselves is trained to address complex and nuanced situations, for example people with pacemakers, or pregnancies, who are concerned about screening systems, the security staff that is now engaging with the public in these public locations has to be well trained, law enforcement individuals. Often times patrons in controlled environments when asked to secondary screen become belligerent and refuse. Amplify this is a highly energized environment like a subway station.

- correct deployment in the available footprint is key. Poor execution, despite good intent, results in failures like we saw at the MOMA.

Correct deployment in the available footprint is key. Poor execution, despite good intent, results in failures like we unfortunately saw at the MOMA.

- Environmental understanding is key. Some of these weapons detection systems react poorly to external interference, such as the vibrations from a. train, and will falsely alert. Thats ironic....here we are talking about putting systems into subways that react very negatively to subways.

Environmental understanding is key. Some of these weapons detection systems react very poorly to external interference, such as the vibrations from a train, and will falsely alert. That’s ironic....here we are talking about putting systems into subways that react very negatively to subways.

- There is an interesting difference here for a public environment like a subway system, versus a private business, such as a sports stadium. In a sports stadium peoples behaviors change versus an open public environment. In a sports stadium, by virtue of the fact that we have bought a ticket, we understand that the stadium has set rules, which may include screening, and secondary screening. That is part of the 'contract' to enter. In a public environment the 'contract' changes, and the expectations change. Screening, secondary screening may meet significantly more resistance, anger, and concerns about rights violations, or profiling.

There is also an interesting difference here for a public environment like a subway system, versus a private business, such as a sports stadium. In a sports stadium, peoples behaviors change versus an open public environment. In a sports stadium, by virtue of the fact that we have bought a ticket, we understand that the stadium has set rules, which may include screening, and secondary screening. That is part of the 'contract' to enter.

In a public environment the 'contract' changes, and the expectations and our rights change. Screening, and secondary screening may meet significantly more resistance, anger, and concerns about rights violations, or profiling.

If a weapons detection system were deployed in the subway, how would the rider experience change (i.e. what should riders expect to face)?

With todays technology, if the intent and conviction is truly is to stop weapons threats, and the end-to-end process continues to be executed with rigor, the riders experience will radically change. Expect delays, expect secondary screening, expect frustration and expect to miss your train.

With today’s technology, if the intent and conviction is truly is to stop weapons threats, and the end-to-end process continues to be executed with rigor, the riders experience will radically change. Expect delays, expect secondary screening, expect frustration and expect to miss your train from time to time.

Is there anything else the public should consider regarding the use of weapons detection solutions for subways?

Is there anything else the public should consider regarding the use of weapons detection solutions on subways?

Nobody wants events like the one that occurred in NYC. They are a sad reflection on the state of society. But solving this is a very complex problem. particularly given the existing infrastructure, patron experience and expectations, logistics, and radical operational considerations. Those examine solutions need to do their homework and not rush to a quick answer because there is no quick answer.

Nobody wants events like the one that occurred in NYC. They are a sad reflection on the state of society. But solving this is a very complex problem. Particularly given the existing infrastructure, patron experience and expectations, logistics, and radical operational considerations. Those examining solutions need to do their homework and not rush to a quick answer because there is no quick answer. In the same manner that organizations like the NBA dig into infinitesimal details to ensure the correct balance of safety and fan experience, and work through all the nuances down to the to-the-inch specifics of placement of systems and why, organizations like the NY subway system, schools and other need to do the same. The difference here for the NY subway system is that the NBA has 32 stadiums with 17 Million fans in a year. The NYC Subway system has 472 locations and over 2.2 Billion patrons.

Original Text

NYC is considering weapons detection solutions for their subway system, what are some of the main logistical considerations you would weigh regarding such a deployment?

There are several very significant considerations, let alone dozens of smaller tactical considerations:

The current state of the art of next -gen weapons detection systems is that they work well, or reasonably well in 'Directed' environments. Places where there a known and reasonable balance of volume of traffic, standard items being carried by individuals, flow of traffic, etc. For example, a sports stadium - people walk in typically in single file, with limited personal items. These directed environments might have high traffic volume, but low personal effects. Or low traffic volume, and a very predictable traffic flow, and higher volume of personal effects, such as a Hospital.
The NYC subways are the exact opposite and the epitome of 'UnDirected' environments. There is no trade-offs such as high volume of traffic for low personal items. This is an environment of High Volume of patron traffic, with unpredictable traffic flows, with a high volume of large personal items. Marry this with a new characteristics - agitation. Few people are irritated if stopped on entry to a school to check for weapons. 100% of patrons in the subway will be.

Do you recommend weapons detection to be used in the NYC subway? Why or why not?

Given people carry many different items on the subway, would that impact a weapons detection performance and false positives?

Absolutely. Again all these systems work well typically in lightly cluttered environments, for example the personal items that an individual can bring into Madison Square Gardens. They have much higher false positive rates as the amount of 'clutter' increases. We have all witnessed the NYC subway system. I personally have seen people with bikes, skis, slow cookers, hibachi grills, grocery bags, luggage, strollers, grocery carts, and more. The significant increase in clutter will increase the number of false positives, which if we truly wish to stop weapons threats, means that everyone of those individuals will need to then be pulled aside and screened. That is a significant staffing, processes, and logistical challenge.
Lets look at Penn station, which has approximately 600,000 patrons every day. Assuming 15% or 75,000 go through at rush-hour. At a typical 5% false positive rate that is 1 person that has to be stopped, pulled aside and screened every second. This will be magnified when we consider the standard subway rider and we would likely see a more likely 30-50% false alert rate. That is 6 to 10 secondary screens every every second.....
Generally, what are the conditions you recommend for deploying a weapons detection solution (i.e. type of facility/venue, personnel, indoor, outdoor, number of systems etc.)?
- Staffing is required, otherwise what is the point? A system alerts indicated a detected weapon, and then someone has to address the alert.
- Training is critical. These staff must be well trained on all nuances of the processes and procedures, which in turn must be well defined in the first place. In the same way the TSA is trained to address complex and nuanced situations, or the NYC police themselves, the security staff that is now engaging with the public in public locations has to be well trained, law enforcement individuals.
- correct deployment in the available footprint is key. Poor execution, despite good intent, results in failures like we saw at the MOMA.
- Environmental understanding is key. Some of these weapons detection systems react poorly to external interference, such as the vibrations from a. train, and will falsely alert. Thats ironic....here we are talking about putting systems into subways that react very negatively to subways.
- There is an interesting difference here for a public environment like a subway system, versus a private business, such as a sports stadium. In a sports stadium peoples behaviors change versus an open public environment. In a sports stadium, by virtue of the fact that we have bought a ticket, we understand that the stadium has set rules, which may include screening, and secondary screening. That is part of the 'contract' to enter. In a public environment the 'contract' changes, and the expectations change. Screening, secondary screening may meet significantly more resistance, anger, and concerns about rights violations, or profiling.

If a weapons detection system were deployed in the subway, how would the rider experience change (i.e. what should riders expect to face)?

Is there anything else the public should consider regarding the use of weapons detection solutions for subways?

Changed Text

NYC is considering weapons detection solutions for their subway system, what are some of the main logistical considerations you would weigh regarding such a deployment?

There are several very significant considerations, let alone dozens of smaller tactical considerations:

The current state of the art of next -gen weapons detection systems is that they work well, or reasonably well in 'Directed' environments.   Places where there a known and reasonable balance of characteristics such as volume of traffic, standard items being carried by individuals, flow of traffic, etc.   For example, a sports stadium - people ingress typically in single file, with limited personal items.   These directed environments might have high traffic volume, but low personal effects.   Or alternatively, low traffic volume, and a very predictable traffic flow, and higher volume of personal effects, such as a Hospital.   
The NYC subways are the exact opposite and the epitome of 'UnDirected' environments.   There is no trade-offs such as high volume of traffic for low personal items.   This is an environment of High Volume of patron traffic, with unpredictable traffic flows, with a high volume of large personal items, and more.  Marry this with a new characteristic - agitation.  Few people are irritated if stopped on entry to a school to check for weapons.   100% of patrons in the subway will be.

The "Flow" of the subway system is a large, complex, and highly organic and integrated system that has been developed over time, shaped by the stations, the people, and so many other things.     Well established systems with millions of stakeholders who integrate into, and therefore support the current system, do not react well when change is forced upon them.    New weapons systems have to adapt and change in order to integrate into the existing system flow.   It will fail if the Subway system is forced to adapt to the new weapons technologies.   
As an example, a telephone network is a complex process that has developed over 100 years. The users are very familiar with how it works.  Imagine a scenario where a new cybersecurity app was added to prevent phishing attacks, but it injected a 2 second pause of dead air when a user makes a phone call, and they don’t hear the familiar ringing tone immediately.   Everyone would hang up, try again, and the subsequent repeated dialing by billions of users would crash the system.

Placement of systems and footprint is critical.  They will have to be placed at natural "chokepoints" in order to maximize the ability to screen, while minimizing the solution costs.    The challenge is many of these chokepoints are already "choked" - therefore the name!   So, processes to keep people moving through are critical.   Some aggressive math by a contingent of data scientists needs to be done to ensure the staffing, and systems and processes are scaled to meet peak hour traffic, and the processes designed to minimize the expected lines this approach would take with currently available technology. This is a complex problem in the order of magnitude of the heavy and continuously daily data crunching done by the airline industry.

Do you recommend weapons detection to be used in the NYC subway? Why or why not?

Yes, but at the right time, and after the pragmatic analysis of all aspects of implementation.   The application can be a logistical nightmare, a staffing challenge, and a significant patron experience detriment. These issues will reduce over time, with further maturing of the available solutions in the market.   There are other complex questions that have to be addressed, such as concerns over personal rights infringement, right-to-carry laws, and more.    Like any technology, weapons detection solutions are in the early stages of their innovation cycles.   They work well in directed traffic environments, but poorly in undirected environments.    You cannot force a very large, highly undirected system like the NYC Subway system to suddenly act in a Directed manner.  It's too late for that.   So, weapons detection systems need further maturing, perhaps specifically to fit into these types of situations.  Said another way, weapons detection systems need to change and adapt to the UnDirected environments "flow" versus force-fitting the Subway System to adapt to the Weapons detection systems.

Given people carry many different items on the subway, would that impact a weapons detection performance and false positives?

Again, all these systems work well typically in lightly cluttered environments, for example the personal items that an individual can bring into most sports arenas, Madison Square Gardens.  Watch, Wallet, Smartphone, Keys, etc.  They have much higher false positive rates as the amount of 'clutter' on a person, or in an environment increases.    We have all witnessed the NYC subway system.  I personally have seen people with bikes, skis, slow cookers, hibachi grills, grocery bags, luggage, strollers, grocery carts, and more.     The significant increase in clutter will increase the number of false positives, which if we truly wish to stop weapons threats, means that every one of those individuals will need to then be pulled aside and screened.   That is a significant staffing, processes, and logistical challenge.
Let’s look at Penn station, which has approximately 600,000 patrons every day. Assuming 15% or 75,000 go through at rush-hour.  At a typical 5% false positive rate that is 1 person that has to be stopped, pulled aside and screened every second.    This will be magnified when we consider the standard subway rider, and that we would likely see a more likely 30-50% false alert rate. That is 6 to 10 secondary screens every second.....
Generally, what are the conditions you recommend for deploying a weapons detection solution (i.e. personnel, indoor, outdoor, number of systems etc.)?
Staffing is required, otherwise what is the point?   A system alert indicates a detected weapon, and then someone has to address the alert.
Training and retraining is critical. The staff must be well trained on all nuances of the processes and procedures, which in turn must be well defined in the first place.    In the same way the TSA or the NYC police themselves is trained to address complex and nuanced situations, for example people with pacemakers, or pregnancies, who are concerned about screening systems, the security staff that is now engaging with the public in these public locations has to be well trained, law enforcement individuals.   Often times patrons in controlled environments when asked to secondary screen become belligerent and refuse. Amplify this is a highly energized environment like a subway station.
Correct deployment in the available footprint is key.   Poor execution, despite good intent, results in failures like we unfortunately saw at the MOMA.
Environmental understanding is key.  Some of these weapons detection systems react very poorly to external interference, such as the vibrations from a train, and will falsely alert.   That’s ironic....here we are talking about putting systems into subways that react very negatively to subways.
There is also an interesting difference here for a public environment like a subway system, versus a private business, such as a sports stadium.   In a sports stadium, peoples behaviors change versus an open public environment.   In a sports stadium, by virtue of the fact that we have bought a ticket, we understand that the stadium has set rules, which may include screening, and secondary screening.  That is part of the 'contract' to enter.   
In a public environment the 'contract' changes, and the expectations and our rights change.  Screening, and secondary screening may meet significantly more resistance, anger, and concerns about rights violations, or profiling.

If a weapons detection system were deployed in the subway, how would the rider experience change (i.e. what should riders expect to face)?

Is there anything else the public should consider regarding the use of weapons detection solutions on subways?

Nobody wants events like the one that occurred in NYC.   They are a sad reflection on the state of society.  But solving this is a very complex problem. Particularly given the existing infrastructure, patron experience and expectations, logistics, and radical operational considerations.   Those examining solutions need to do their homework and not rush to a quick answer because there is no quick answer.   In the same manner that organizations like the NBA dig into infinitesimal details to ensure the correct balance of safety and fan experience, and work through all the nuances down to the to-the-inch specifics of placement of systems and why, organizations like the NY subway system, schools and other need to do the same.  The difference here for the NY subway system is that the NBA has 32 stadiums with 17 Million fans in a year.  The NYC Subway system has 472 locations and over 2.2 Billion patrons.

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